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Abstract—The space environment is currently undergoing a
substantial change and many new entrants to the market are
deploying devices, satellites and systems in space; this evolution
has been termed as NewSpace. The change is complicated by
technological developments such as deploying machine learning
based autonomous space systems and the Internet of Space
Things (IoST). In the IoST, space systems will rely on satellite-
to-x communication and interactions with wider aspects of the
ground segment to a greater degree than existing systems. Such
developments will inevitably lead to a change in the cyber secur-
ity threat landscape of space systems. Inevitably, there will be a
greater number of attack vectors for adversaries to exploit, and
previously infeasible threats can be realised, and thus require
mitigation. In this paper, we present a reference architecture
(RA) that can be used to abstractly model in situ applications
of this new space landscape. The RA specifies high-level system
components and their interactions. By instantiating the RA for
two scenarios we demonstrate how to analyse the attack surface
using attack trees.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The space industry is seeing substantial change as new
organisations enter the sector and its associated supply chain.
These organisations have entered the industry as technology
develops and barriers to entry have fallen, thus expanding the
industry beyond the traditional large players and loosening
their control [1]. This change to the environment, which has
seen commercial space take a more prominent role, has been
described as ’NewSpace’ by NASA researchers [2]; others talk
of ’alt.space’ or ’entrepreneurial space’. Examples include
SpaceX’s SmallSat Rideshare Program, with costs as low as $1
million per satellite, with a payload up to 200 kg [3] (although
previous base prices were set at $2.25 million for a payload up
978-1-7281-2734-7/20/$31.00 c©2020 IEEE
to 150 kg [4]) and the use of crowdfunding to decrease barriers
to entry [5]. Such developments are allowing many new
parties to deploy devices in space. This change is complicated
by technological developments such as machine learning-
based autonomous space systems [6, 7] and the Internet of
Space Things (IoST) [8, 9]. Key advances are centred around
CubeSats, and the IoST is facilitating connectivity at low cost.
IoST systems usually rely on satellite-to-x communication and
interactions with broader aspects of the ground segment to
a higher degree than existing space systems. Further, these
IoST systems feature a myriad of components, developed by
a range of companies from a number of countries, which are
then launched in vehicles carrying multiple payloads. Such
developments impact the cyber security threat landscape of
space systems. Consequently, there will be a significantly
greater number of attack vectors for adversaries to exploit, and
previously infeasible threats will now need to be managed.
In this paper, we identify the attack surfaces of this evolving
space industry. The developments of New space and IoST
are first presented and discussed. These developments bring
new challenges and opportunities to more traditional space
systems [10], including issues for defence and security [11].
Previous work has shown that standard techniques (such
as fault trees) can be improved through appropriate visual-
isation [12]. Another tool for visualisation is a Reference
Architecture (RA) which can support the identification of
attack surfaces in the system being described. Such approaches
have been used previously for other industries where there
are new agile entrants such as smart homes [13] and for
connected and autonomous vehicles [14]. The reason for
developing these, and a space reference architecture, is to
provide a tool to allow attack surface analysis. Since newer
entrants in NewSpace and the Internet of Space Things are
not traditional companies, a reference architecture can help
them understand the ecosystem and some of the threats. An
RA can provide a better understanding of the new system and
allow abstractly modelling of in situ applications in this new
landscape. The RA specifies high-level system components
and their interactions, and builds upon similar approaches
used to understand changes to transport systems and building
systems.
We instantiate the RA with concrete components to illistrate
how a threat analysis can be performed. We develop and
consider use cases, and then identify threat actors and their
goals for subverting the system. There are existing analyses of
threats to space systems (such as [15] and [16, Appendix E]),
and so to avoid repeating existing work, we focus on the
changes in threat actors, goals and methods that arise due to
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the changing space environment.
The RAs of satellite systems and space robots are specifically
addressed in this paper. By using these abstract RAs, we can
analyse the potential attacks against individual components.
Threat modelling approaches can then be performed to analyse
the threats. We examine our example use cases by developing
attack trees for these specific scenarios. Our example use case
will focus on autonomous debris collection. Through the use
of these instantiations, the methodology for identifying new
threats is explained.
In this work we make the following contributions:
1. We present a reference architecture of a space system which
includes satellites, planetary robots and the ground segment
that can be instantiated to support IoST functionality.
2. We identify changes to the space ecosystem and the
changes they will have on adversary goals, motivations and
capabilities and their impact on the threats that adversaries can
perpetrate.
3. Using an example use case of autonomous debris collection
to instantiate the reference architecture, we demonstrate the
attack surface of specific scenario which will be facilitated by
NewSpace, the IoST and use of autonomy in space systems.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in
Section 2 related work will be presented. Section 3 will
present an analysis of the changing space ecosystem and the
impact that will have on future threats. The abstract reference
architecture for modelling these new systems is presented
in Section 4. Section 5 describes the methodology used
for performing an attack surface analysis on an instantiated
reference architecture. Our example use case of autonomous
debris collection will be analysed in Section 6. Finally,
Section 7 will discuss remaining open challenges and Section 8
will present concluding remarks.
2. RELATED WORK
Future space systems are expected to undergo major changes
in terms of how they communicate, operate and the culture
around the commercialisation of space. This means that there
is an increasing interest in the security of these space systems,
not just from existing mature organisations, but also from
new entrants that lack experience in developing secure space
systems. This section will introduce the existing work on
security of space systems, how space systems have been
modelled, and how, or indeed if, these modelling approaches
can be applied to a security analysis of space systems.
Space Security
Space forms part of a nation’s Critical National Infrastructure
(CNI) and provides vital services that other CNIs rely upon for
a range of services from positioning, navigation and timing to
communication. The importance of cyber security in space is
not specific to a single country but represents an international
concern [17] and is the subject of increasing focus. The
authors of [18, 19] proposed a number of policy changes that
should be made to improve the state of cyber security in space,
from encouraging greater use of encryption to advising space
organisations to be more open with respect to working with
cyber security researchers and facilitating information sharing.
In both [20] and [21] a USA-centric threat assessment from
a military perspective are presented. In these reports coun-
terspace weapons are classified into (i) kinetic physical (e.g.,
anti-satellite missiles), (ii) non-kinetic physical (e.g., lasers,
high-powered microwaves and EMPs), (iii) electronic (e.g.,
jamming and spoofing radio communications) and (iv) cyber
— where attacks focus on the data being transmitted and the
data systems themselves. The report also contains details of
the capabilities of other countries and independent groups,
but focuses on geopolitical rivals to the USA. The authors
chose to separate information security (which comprises the
cyber category) from electronic security. However, this paper
will consider cyber security attacks to be both electronic-
and information security-based. State actors, such as France,
have announced plans for a greater focus on defending their
space systems [22, 23]. This includes surveillance cameras
on satellites, greater satellite detection abilities, patrolling
nano-satellites and powerful lasers that could be used to blind
adversary satellites, with plans to deploy surveillance cameras
and patrol nano-satellites from 2023 onwards.
Due to the changing space landscape, new threats are being in-
troduced that need to be considered. In [24] the potential risks
posed by equipping small satellites with propulsion systems
(which they are not typically equipped with) was considered.
The authors identified that these small satellite systems do not
always encrypt their “telemetry, tracking, and control (TTC)
or mission data communication links”. This combination
means that an unauthorised actor could send commands to the
satellite to manipulate its orbit. The authors propose a solution
to require encrypting the command and control links before a
satellite is allowed to be launched as part of a No Encryption,
No Fly regulatory requirement. Depending on the actual
requirements of a system, if confidentiality is not required,
digital signatures could be used to provide authentication and
non-repudiation of the transmitted commands without the need
to encrypt them.
The Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS)
has also published guides for a variety of purposes such
as: mission planning [25], system interconnection [26] and
applying security to protocols [27] among others. CCSDS also
published a report on current space cyber security threats [15].
In that report, a brief description of threat actors and the types
of threats they may perform is presented. The report includes
a list of threats in a variety of scenarios, with the impact of the
threat described and an “illustrative” likelihood shown for each
threat. The authors note that the threats identified, impacts,
and mitigations will change when considered under different
scenarios compared to the hypothetical scenario presented.
There has been much work on developing technical solutions
to mitigate some security threats. For example, in [28]
the authors proposed partitioning functionally independent
software by time and space to avoid unintended interactions.
Other work [29] has looked at techniques to secure the
communication links in hybrid satellite networks. However, it
is still necessary to have a methodology to represent what the
space system is and how an adversary will compromise the
system’s components in order to achieve its goals.
Reference Architectures
To better understand the structure of systems, RAs are useful
because they allow a system to be defined in a methodological
manner. These models are useful in a variety of contexts,
such as when teams are working on different components of
a system and need to understand how these components will
interact. By using an RA the interactions between components
are clearly specified. With an instantiated RA (where concrete
components and interactions are provided in place of abstract
ones) the attack surface of a system can be analysed using
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several tools, such as attack trees [30].
In general, RAs contain multiple viewpoints into the system
that they represent. Multiple combinations of viewpoints have
been used by different RAs, with the viewpoints selected
based on the purpose of the RA. Examples of these viewpoints
include:
• Functional: how the components work and what their tasks
are
• Communication: how the components interact
• Implementation: how the components are implemented
• Enterprise: the relation between organisations and users
• Usage: concerns of expected usage of the system
• Information: the types of information handled by the system
• Physical: the physical objects in the system and their
connections
For a cyber security analysis two of these viewpoints are vital:
the Functional and Communication viewpoints. These two
components need to be specified in order to understand what
the system does and which interactions between components
are required to provide that functionality. To ensure the
usability of a RA for its purpose it is important to focus
on the required viewpoints. It is useful to avoid defining
viewpoints that are less relevant for a cyber security analysis.
For example, including an information viewpoint would be
useful if confidentiality is vital for a system. However, for a
general RA used for a cyber security analysis, this viewpoint
is difficult to define without a priori knowledge of the system.
RAs have been previously applied to space systems in a
variety of contexts. Examples include for on-board software
(AMASS Reference Tool Architecture [31], ORSA-P [32],
[33], SAVOIR OSRA [34]), data systems (RASDS [35]) and
mission design [36, 37]. These space-system specific RAs
could potentially be adapted to undertake a cyber security
analysis of space systems. For example, an RA that focuses
on software would be useful as an implementation viewpoint
and an RA that focuses on data systems would be useful as an
information viewpoint. However, this additional information
is typically too detailed for a high-level cyber security analysis
of a system. Hence why we argue in this paper that a high-level
specification of space systems in terms of their functionality
and the interactions of the components that provide this
functionality is a better approach to performing the initial
cyber security analysis of space system before focusing on the
identified areas of interest.
There are also similarities between RAs and approaches such
as Model-Based Systems Engineering [38] and Failure Mode,
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). Where failure
mode maps to how the system is being attacked, effects maps
to what impact the attack has on the system and criticality
maps to calculating the risk posed by the threat. Risk may
be calculated by the sum of the impacts weighted by the
likelihood. For example, in [39] a reliability analysis was
performed using FMECA for CubeSats. Part of this work
included providing a functional block diagram which is similar
to the functional viewpoint of a RA. Also in [40, Section 3.3]
produces similar output to a threat modelling of a system.
Other approaches, such as the block diagram of the Magellan
flight system [41] are useful starting points for a RA. However,
additional detail needs to be added for the diagram to be useful
for a cyber security attack surface analysis.
UML [42] and SysML [43] is the basis for modelling lan-
guages that are useful for describing systems in terms of a
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Satellite-to-satellite
communication ↑↑↑ ↑ —
Satellite-to-ground
communication ↑ ↓ —
Space environment
sensing — ↑↑↑ —
Cost of deployment ↓ — / ↑ ↓↓↓
Barriers to Entry ↓ ↑ ↓↓↓
Applications &
Capabilities ↑ ↑↑↑ ↑
Access to data ↑ — ↑↑↑
Component Reuse ↑ — ↑↑↑
Hardware
Specialisation ↓ ↑ ↓
Changes to mission
scope ↑ ↑↑↑ ↑
Mean Deployment
lifetime ↓ — ↓
Table 1. Dimensions of Change in Space Ecosystem. The
quantity of arrows signifies the magnitude of impact, more
arrows signify a greater impact. A dash signifies no impact.
Arrow pointing up means increasing arrow pointing down
means decreasing.
model. While UML can be used to describe a variety of
systems, its focus is on describing software. SysML, on the
other hand, is a subset of UML with several extensions that
aims to model systems engineering applications. A downside
to both of these modelling languages is that they are complex
(although SysML is arguably less complex than UML) and
require specifying a broad range of details about the system
being modelled. As such, these are useful for a low-level
security analysis of a system or systems-of-systems where
attack surfaces can be detected [44] and automatic generation
of attack trees are performed [45]. However, for a high-level
security analysis of a system, these tools require specifying
information that is not yet necessarily available. In this case, a
reference architecture is a better tool for a security analysis,
before using it to guide the design of a UML or SysML model
for detailed analysis.
3. ECOSYSTEM AND ADVERSARY CHANGES
Table 1 presents a high-level summary of the changes to the
space ecosystem along several socio-technical dimensions.
For each of these changes, a dimension of change is shown
as being increased, decreased or remaining unchanged. We
focus on three areas impacted by recent developments in
technology and culture: (i) connectivity (via the Internet of
Space Things), (ii) autonomy and (iii) culture (via NewSpace).
We focus on these three areas since they have led to the
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most significant changes in the threat landscape of similar
systems such as Connected and Autonomous Vehicles [46]
and Smart Cities [47]. For example, connected vehicles have,
through these advances, introduced new attack surfaces that
were hitherto unlikely vectors of attack [48].
Communication between satellites is currently typically per-
formed in order to relay messages from one endpoint to
another and there is little need for inter-satellite connectiv-
ity. However, the introduction of the IoST and deploying
systems with greater autonomy will lead to new applications
that require satellite-to-satellite communications [49]. For
example, new information may need to be shared with other
satellites directly, and how satellites perform tasks may need
communication to decide how to allocate these tasks (e.g., via
leader election). Conversely, autonomy may lead to a decrease
in satellite-to-ground communication as there is a reduced
need for human-in-the-loop commands to be received. It is
recognised that the IoST is likely to lead to an increase in
satellite-to-ground due to the additional telemetry that needs
to be reported.
Sensing in the space environment is an important activity for
existing space systems. Many are deployed to perform Earth
monitoring [50] for reasons of food security, climate science
as well as national security reasons. There is also sensing
performed of the space environment as space weather events
can have adverse effects on hardware in space and on Earth.
Future space systems will need to perform increased sensing to
support autonomy, as understanding the environment context is
an important part of an autonomous decision making process.
The cost of deployment dimension amounts to a change in the
economic context, driven by new satellites deployment capab-
ilities. This is caused by developments in novel approaches to
launch vehicle innovation in terms of construction, design and
reuse that have led to a decrease in costs [51]. The cultural
shift of NewSpace will have the largest impact on decreasing
the cost of deployment in space, however, other changes such
as the use of commercial-off-the-shelf components as part of
the IoST will also lead to a decrease. Aspects of autonomy
may increase the deployment cost due to the new functionality
it enables and thus additional testing it will incur.
Lowering the barriers to entry in the space ecosystem is the
symptom of a deep structural change that occurred when space
changed from a sector governed by a centralised organisation
to one where organisation is decentralised [52]. This change
amounts to a cultural and philosophical shift toward greater
private entity participation [53] and is arranged along the
business model of a public-private partnership [53] where
public bodies (e.g., NASA) share costs, risks and potential
economic returns with private sector entities (e.g. Blue
Origin).
Applications and capabilities include developments in the
satellite industry, human spaceflight for space tourism, plat-
forms, manufacturing, mining and resource utilisation [54].
Technological change in terms of connectivity and autonomy
will enable novel applications that can be deployed (e.g.,
autonomous docking). Changes brought by NewSpace will
facilitate these new applications and capabilities by reducing
barriers to entry and facilitating commercialisation of these
novel deployments.
Access to data is a key dimension of the space ecosystem
as it develops concomitantly with the evolution of a global
economy that is increasingly data dependent [54]. With
easier access to space, information that was previously highly
controlled has become accessible to more organisations. This
has been seen with Earth observation information [55, 56] and
especially satellite maps such as via Google Earth.
Component reuse refers primarily to less expensive and re-
usable launch vehicles that signifies a change in the economies
of space systems. This reuse of systems may be extended
further in the future by refuelling and re-purposing satellites
in orbit [57].
The use of bespoke or standardised hardware is encompassed
by the hardware specialisation dimension. The reuse of
standardised equipment and hardware can lead to a reduction
in costs for launch, development and maintenance of the
system. For example NASA’s Mars 2020 rover is reusing the
template of Curiosity in order to simply the mission design,
reduce risks and to save on costs [58].
The changes to mission scope comprises a key cultural shift
in which power to shape society is transferred from science
and scientific exploration to commercialisation — that is,
through public-private partnerships. For example, NewSpace
will allow organisations such as NASA and ESA to focus on
new research as part of deep space missions, while private
enterprises can take charge of routine flights between Earth
and the International Space Station [53] by using knowledge
that has already been generated from previous research.
Technological developments in connectivity and autonomy
will allow novel missions to be designed and executed, such
as plans to deploy the autonomous JPL Helicopter Scout on
Mars in 2021 [59].
Due to the high cost of deploying hardware into space existing
systems are designed to have a long mean deployment lifetime
to mitigate the cost of deployment. With reduced costs due to
the use of commercial off the shelf (COTS) components and
NewSpace there will be less pressure on long deployments. A
major impact of this change is that more recently developed
hardware and software will be deployed in space, compared
to the current conservative attitudes that focuses on old and
tested hardware and software [60].
These selected dimensions encompass some of the important
changes that increase connectivity, autonomy and culture
change may bring to the space ecosystem. Many of these
changes come with benefits to the functionality that can be
provided with space systems. However, these changes to the
space ecosystem will also bring changes to the threat actors
seeking to compromise space systems. In part, threat actors
will be able to benefit from the same space ecosystem changes
that the public and private sector benefit from. Threat actors
will also benefit from the increased attack surface that these
systems expose, especially due to increases in connectivity
and autonomy of future space systems.
Threat Actors
These changes to the space ecosystem will lead to the changes
in the threat actors trying to attack a space system. This
involves changes to their goals, motivations and what they
can achieve with the same capabilities and resources. To
summarise these changes, abstract threat actors are shown
in Table 2. The threat actor categories are derived from [16,
Appendix D] and the dimensions to describe the threat actors
derived from [61].
This table is provided with an example of how to describe
the specific threat actor being considered when analysing
4
Threat
Actor Example
Goals &
Motivations Capabilities Environment Resources
In
di
vi
du
al
Outsider Hacktivist
Personal
satisfaction;
Passion; Ideology.
Doesn’t believe in
climate change,
wants to impact
functioning of
climate satellite
Limited Remote access Minimal
Insider Cleaner Financial gain;Discontent Limited
Permission-less
internal access Internal knowledge
Trusted
Insider Contractor
Financial gain;
Discontent Moderate
Internal access with
some permissions Internal knowledge
Privileged
Insider Employee
Financial gain;
Discontent High
Internal access with
high permissions Internal knowledge
G
ro
up
Ad hoc
A group coming
together over a
time-critical
event (e.g. Brexit,
or a collective
movement of
Extinction
Rebellion)
Dependant on
group purpose:
Ideological,
financial, political
Limited to Moderate Remote access Limited knowledgeand financial
Established
A group(e.g. the
Anonymous
group)
Moderate to High Remote access Moderate knowledgeand financial
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n
Competitor
An organisation
about to compete
for a tender for
services
Corporate
espionage;
Financial gain;
Reputation damage
Organisation size
related
Remote access
Organisation size
related
Supplier
A supplier who
fears their
services are soon
to be relinquished
Information gain;
Financial gain
Remote access;
Knowledge of
internal structure
Partner
A partner with
whom a
relationship is
starting to sour or
is soon to end
Information gain;
Financial gain
Limited internal
access; Knowledge
of internal structure
Customer
A customer who
feels they have
had poor or unfair
service
Information gain;
Financial gain
Remote access;
Knowledge of
internal structure
Nation-State Geopolitical rival State rivalry;Geopolitics
Sophisticated;
Coordinated; Access
to state secrets
Remote and internal
access
Extensive knowledge;
Extensive financial;
Advanced equipment
Table 2. Threat Actors (based on [16, Appendix D] with dimensions from [61]) plus space ecosystem specific examples.
the attack surface of a space system. Identification of a
specific threat actor is required to understand the motivations,
goals, capabilities and resources available when attacking the
system. This table does not consider accidental, structural
and environmental threat sources seen in [16, Appendix D]
as the focus of this work is on adversarial threat sources. We
recognise that these aspects are still important to consider
since they can have security implications. For example, the
high radiation environment in space can lead to bit flips in
security-critical areas of memory. These threats will need to
be analysed and mitigated using other techniques.
Changes in Threats to Space Systems
Using the identified threat actor and the high-level changes to
the space ecosystem in areas of communication, autonomy and
culture, we now present general changes in the threats to space
systems these ecosystem changes may lead to. These threats
are not for specific space systems but instead target the general
space ecosystem. While these can direct threat analysis, threat
modelling will need to be performed for specific systems to
understand the specific threats they will face.
To begin with, an increase in satellite-to-satellite communic-
ation [8] will present an initial increase in risk to systems.
This is because there will be an increase in communication
through resource-constrained devices vulnerable to a variety
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of attacks such as interception, spoofing, replay and others. It
is acknowledged that in the future alternate communication
methodologies such as laser-based communication in the
European Data Relay System [62] will reduce the risk posed
by these threats. This is because laser-based communications
are harder to intercept and spoof [63].
The inclusion of autonomy in space systems will also impact
how the systems can be attacked. The application of autonomy
to control satellites will be needed for a variety of use cases
from simplifying management of a large swarm to orbit correc-
tions and debris avoidance. There may be simple applications
of autonomy (such as via Finite State Machines [64]), but
more complicated and less easily analysed techniques such
as deep learning are also likely to be applied. In applying
autonomy to space systems some parallels can be drawn with
autonomous vehicles, where the inclusion of autonomy has
led to new ways in which the vehicle and infrastructure can be
attacked [46].
With the reduction in barriers to entry, new organisations will
increasingly become capable of deploying hardware in space.
This will introduce several issues similar to those seen as new
organisations enter IoT markets. Firstly, new entrants tend
to focus on functionality rather than security. Secondly, if
new entrants fail, it could leave uncontrolled devices in orbit
that will no longer be updated or maintained. Finally, the cost
reductions will extend to new organisations that may wish to
deploy hardware for malicious purposes. This increase in ease
of deploying malicious hardware will also lead to an increase
in the risk of cyber-physical attacks (such as the physical
attacks described in [21]).
Technological developments, especially around areas such
as Software Defined Radios (SDRs), will increase the ways
in which satellites can be interacted with. For example,
the r/sdr community2 involves members capturing transmis-
sions from weather satellites (e.g., NOAA). SDRs are also
capable of transmission, so satellite systems with unencryp-
ted/unauthenticated communication channels can be interacted
with by unintended entities [65]. Predicting revolutions such
as SDRs are difficult but is important to investigate such
changes as they alter the outcome of risk analyses.
While not a new threat, the long lifetime of devices can present
a threat to space systems that will be compounded by new
deployments. For example, over the lifetime of a device
how are changes in security standards handled (such as new
key length recommendations or hash algorithms being found
to be vulnerable). One solution would be for the system to
be deployed with above-recommended standards where the
aim would be for these standards to be the recommended
standards by the system’s end of life. An alternate approach
would be to support firmware updating and provide additional
resources above the mission’s requirements to support new and
more expensive techniques. However, this will also provide
a potential attack vector where an adversary could perform a
firmware update to obtain control of the systems (as seen in
automotive systems [66]). While these may not be questions
that established members of the space sector need to consider,
new entrants will need to understand what to plan for based on
the length of their deployments. The actions new entrants take
will then also have an impact on the established organisations
and their deployments.
2https://www.reddit.com/r/sdr/
Summary
With this understanding of how the space ecosystem and the
general threats it faces will change, we will now present a
reference architecture to model space systems. This reference
architecture will allow an analysis of how an adversary will
attempt to achieve its goal associated with specific threats
identified from threat modelling.
4. REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE
A RA provides an abstract model of a system where multiple
viewpoints can be specified, including: functional, communic-
ation, physical, information, enterprise and others. For this
RA we focus on specifying a hybrid functional-interaction
viewpoint to simplify the analysis. Interactions that cross
the boundary of the system identify the attack surfaces of
the system. The internal interactions between components
specify the path an attacker can take to compromise further
components.
It is important to consider the specific scenarios that an RA
will be used to analyse. The RA presented focuses on space
systems in situ once they have been fully deployed. We do
not focus on scenarios such as during launch or decent as
there will be additional context information that needs to be
specified to consider a cyber security analysis. Our future
work will aim to investigate these additional scenarios.
Satellite Sub-architecture
Figure 1 specifies the abstract hybrid functional-interaction
viewpoint of a satellite or system of satellites, which this work
focuses on. Other components such as the ground segment or
other space-based deployments (e.g., planetary robots) may
be important to specify based on the application of interest.
Band Up-link (GHz) Down-link (GHz)
C 3.7 to 4.2 5.925 to 6.425
Ku 11.7 to 12.2 14.0 to 14.5
Ka 17.7 to 21.7 27.5 to 30.5
L/S 1.610 to 1.625 2.483 to 2.500
X 7.145 to 7.190 8.4 to 8.45
Table 3. Frequency spectrum allocations
Wireless Communications— The wireless communications
handle the transmission and reception of data from the
ground segment or from other space-based devices. These
wireless communications will typically be implemented using
radio frequency (RF) wireless communication, the common
allocations are shown in Table 3. Based on the purpose the
satellite communications can be classified as [67]: Earth-to-
space, telecommand, space-to-earth, telemetry, radio metric,
spacecraft and space-to-space. However, there is also a move
towards laser-based wireless communications in future space
systems.
Example Instantiations
• Short Range Omni-directional
• Short Range Directional
• Long Range Directional
• Laser-based Directional [62]
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Figure 1. Functional Viewpoint of Satellite Reference Architecture
Example Attacks
1. Denial of Service (via Jamming) [68] [20, p. 4]
2. Sending spurious commands [69]
3. Message modification [69]
4. Eavesdropping [69]
5. Spoofing [20, p. 4]
6. Elevation of Privilege (via crafted messages)
Interactions
↔ */Communications: Sending/Receiving Command
↔ Data Storage: Send/Receiving Data
Input/Output Ports— Input/Output ports allow satellites to
interact with a space station or other satellites in both physical
and digital ways. Satellites can supply energy and fuel to the
connected satellite [70]. Data can also be exchanged with the
connected satellite.
Example Instantiations
• Connection with a docked vehicle
Example Attacks
1. Malicious use of ports
Interactions
↔ Space Station/Power Storage, Space Station/Fuel Stor-
age: Receiving energy or fuel (when docked)
↔ Space Station/Data Storage: Receive and send data to
the space station (when docked)
↔ Power Storage, Fuel Storage: Providing energy (when
docked)
↔ Fuel Storage: Providing fuel (when docked)
↔ Data Storage: Receive and send data to local data
storage (when docked)
Thermal—The thermal regulation maintains the temperature of
the satellite at correct levels for proper functioning. Cooling
can be achieved by radiating the heat that is generated by
satellite out into space. Heating components may also be
necessary to ensure other sensitive components are not allowed
to become too cold to function.
Example Instantiations
• Heaters
• Radiators
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• Cryogenic Fuel Cooling
Example Attacks
1. Disabling functionality to prevent components being
kept at the correct temperature
Interactions
← Physical Interactions: Orienting the radiators
→ Space Environment: Infrared radiation output
Sensing—Sensing is a key functional component of satellite
systems as sensors will need to gather information about the
satellite itself, the environment it is operating it and potentially
other objects that it is monitoring. This information will
typically be stored locally before being transmitted to Earth for
further analysis. Future space system may use this information
to guide autonomous decision making.
Example Instantiations
• Imaging
• Attitude Determination
• Temperature
• Radiation
• Gyroscope
• Laser altimeter
• LIDAR
• Radar
• Ranging Instrument
• Sounder
• Accelerometer
• Imaging Radiometer
• Radiometer
• Timing (e.g., atomic clocks)
Example Attacks
1. Denial of Service (temporary or permanent blinding of
sensors [20, p. 3])
2. Spoofing
Interactions
← Space Environment: Observing the environment state
→ Data Storage: Producing the sensed values
Power Management: Generation—Power generation ensures
that the satellite is producing electrical power to continue
operating. Depending on the mission context different power
generation components will be used. For example, as the
distance from the sun increases solar panels become less
effective making RTGs or fuel cells more attractive. Ensuring
the continued operation of this component is vital for a satellite
to continue operating.
Example Instantiations
• Solar Panel
• RTG
• Nuclear Reactor
• Fuel Cell
Example Attacks
1. Resource depletion (Availability)
2. Denial of Service (Damage via high-powered lasers [20,
p. 3])
Interactions
← Data analysis: Receiving Commands
← Fuel Storage: Providing fuel for Fuel Cells
→ Power Management: Storage: Storing unused power
Power Management: Storage—The power generated by the
satellite will typically need to be temporarily stored. This
may be because power generation only occurs for part of a
satellite’s orbit (such as when not in the shadow of the Earth)
or because the power generation does not run continuously.
In general, energy storage will typically be via electrical or
electrochemical means, but mechanical is also a possible
storage mechanism.
Example Instantiations
• Battery
• Flywheel [71]
• (Super)capacitor
Example Attacks
1. Lifetime reduction (Availability)
Interactions
↔ Input/Output Ports: Receiving/Accepting power
← Power Management: Generation: Storing unused
power
→ Attitude Control: Proving energy supply
→ Propulsion: Proving energy supply
↔ *: Powering other components
Fuel Storage—Fuel storage acts as a chemical energy store.
This fuel can be used for propulsion and power generation.
Example Instantiations
• Storage tanks
Example Attacks
1. Resource depletion (Availability)
Interactions
↔ Input/Output Ports: Sending/receiving from other
satellites
→ Propulsion: Proving fuel for use in engines
→ Attitude Control: Proving fuel for use in RCS
→ Power Generation: Proving fuel to be converted to
power
Actuators: Attitude Control—This component is concerned
with maintaining or altering the satellite’s attitude. Ensuring
the correct attitude is important for communication, sensing,
docking, power generation and other activities as a specific
orientation of the satellite may be needed to perform these
activities.
Example Instantiations
• Reaction Wheels
• Reaction Control Thrusters (RCS) [72]
Example Attacks
1. Fuel Exhaustion (Denial of Service)
2. Reaction Wheel Saturation (Denial of Service)
Interactions
← Data Analysis: Receiving commands
← Power Storage: Providing power
← Fuel Storage: Providing fuel for RCS
→ Space Environment: Impact the orientation of the
vehicle
Actuators: Propulsion—The propulsion component is respons-
ible for the satellite’s movement this may be to change orbit or
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to perform station keeping activities to maintain a specific
orbit. Orbit change may be used to perform rendezvous
manoeuvres.
Example Instantiations
• Solid Fuel Rocket Motor
• Liquid Fuel Rocket Motor
• Ion Engine
Example Attacks
1. Incorrect actuation preventing use (Availability)
Interactions
← Data Analysis: Receiving commands
← Power Management: Storage: Providing power
← Fuel Storage: Providing fuel for engines
Actuators: Physical Interactions—Satellites can be equipped
with mechanical components which allows physical interac-
tions with other objects in space including non-cooperative
objects (such as debris or defunct satellites), supporting
docking activities by grabbing onto approaching satellites and
others. Some of these physical interactions will be vital for
other components, such as ensuring the orientation of solar
panels and radiators are correct.
Example Instantiations
• Robotic Grabbing Arm
• Harpoon
• Docking
• One time actuators (e.g., burn wire)
• Orientation of Solar Panels and Radiators
Example Attacks
1. Trigger actuator at an incorrect time
Interactions
← Data Analysis: Receive commands
→ Thermal: Orienting the radiators
Data Storage—Satellites will need to store data, including (i)
the firmware and software used to manipulate the satellite, (ii)
maps and navigation information, (iii) information received
from other systems, and (iv) other information necessary for
different use cases. This data will not be stored in a central
location on the satellite and will be stored in multiple locations.
Data storage should also be segregated based on the purpose
of the data. For example, data from other systems should not
be stored in the same location as the satellite’s software, but
implementation details may mean that this is not the case.
Example Instantiations
• Non-volatile Memory (e.g., Solid State Hard Drives)
• Volatile Memory (e.g., RAM)
Example Attacks
1. Privilege Elevation leading to unauthorised access
2. Installation of unauthorised or un-vetted software [15,
Section 3.4.9]
3. Corruption due to high-power microwave [20, p. 3]
Interactions
↔ Wireless Communication: Sending/Receiving Data
↔ Input/Output Port: Sending/receiving data from an-
other satellite
↔ Data Analysis: Providing data to be analysed and
storing the analysis result
← Sensing: Receiving sensing data
Data Analysis—To make sense of the data obtained from
external sources (such as the sensors) and the data stored
locally in the satellite analysis will need to be performed
on it. This analysis may use simple conditions to trigger
actuators (e.g., if temperate rises above a threshold, then
turn on the radiators), but more complicated techniques
such as machine learning models will also be used. These
machine learning models will become prevalent in satellites
due to autonomous deployments. Data analysis also includes
processing command and control information sent to the
satellite.
Example Instantiations
• Machine Learning models [73] (Motion planning [74])
• Error detection
• Safety monitoring
• Telemetry Production
• Command & Control
Example Attacks
1. Adversarial machine learning
2. Elevation of Privilege
Interactions
↔ Data Storage: Receiving/Sending Data
→ Propulsion, Attitude Control: Sending commands
→ Attitude Control: Sending commands
→ Power Management: Generation: Sending commands
Planetary Robot Sub-architecture
Robots are currently used on a planetary environment for
scientific activities such as exploration and analysis of the
surface. In this case, the stationary robots or rovers per-
form the exploration of an unstructured terrain to find and
categorise several predefined targets (e.g., mineral content,
biological markers). Once the target is identified, a specified
activity would be performed on the target depending on the
mission objectives, such as drilling or sample capture and
return. Future applications may include construction on a
planetary surface. In this case, the tasks may be controlled
and monitored by an operator (planetary surface station) or
performed autonomously by a group of collaborating robots.
An RA to capture the functional components and interactions
between these components is shown in Figure 2.
This sub-architecture reuses the following components from
other sub-architectures:
• Satellite/Data Storage
• Satellite/Data Analysis
• Satellite/Fuel Storage
• Satellite/Power Management: Generation
• Satellite/Power Management: Storage
• Satellite/Thermal
Communication—Like the satellite communication component,
this wireless communication component for planetary robots
deals with information transmission to satellites and other
robots. A difference is that this communication component
may include much shorter range peer-to-peer communications
between planetary robots. Applying wireless ad-hoc network
(WANET) will be useful in a decentralised communication
scenario because there is no existing infrastructure for the
planetary robots to rely upon. This ad-hoc wireless com-
munication could be implemented via Internet of Things
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Figure 2. Functional Viewpoint of Robot Reference Architecture
(IoT) technologies [9] such as LoRa [75] or NB-IoT [76].
Reusing this technology could simplify future deployment due
to experience gained from terrestrial deployments.
Example Instantiations
• Short Range Omni-directional
• Short Range Directional
Example Attacks
1. Denial of Service (via Jamming)
2. Spoofing
3. Elevation of Privilege (via crafted messages)
4. Replay attacks
5. Sybil attacks
Interactions
↔ Data Storage: Providing the transmission data and
reception of data
Sensing—Sensors are one of the key components of planetary
robots, as they provide information about the environment that
they have been sent to study. Future autonomous planetary
robots will be highly reliant on the information collected by
the sensors to build a model of the unknown environment. For
example, the robot could scan the planet surface to obtain
information on the terrain and mineral distribution.
Example Instantiations
• Imaging
• Surface Scanner
• Location
• Radiation
Example Attacks
1. Induce misleading readings (Spoof, Replay, Delay)
2. Blind, Jam
3. Tamper
Interactions
← Environment: Observing the environment state
→ Data Storage: Producing the sensed values
Input/Output Ports— Input/Output ports allow a robot to
interact with other robots in both physical and digital ways.
They facilitate robots exchanging information in a highly
secure manner and also allow resource transfer between them.
10
Example Instantiations
• Physically Connection between outside devices or inner
functional parts.
Example Attacks
1. Pretend to be a robot belonging to a different organisa-
tion (Spoofing)
Interactions
↔ Robot/Power Storage, Robot/Fuel Storage: Receiving
energy or fuel when physically connected
↔ Robot/Data Storage: Receive and send data to other
physically connected robots
↔ Power Management: Storage, Fuel Storage: Providing
energy (when physically connected)
↔ Data Storage: Receive and send data to local data
storage (when physically connected)
Actuators—This module contains any components that can
perform an action with an impact on the physical world. This
may include, applying the actuators to grab other robot (arms),
mine (drill) and carry objects (cranes).
Example Instantiations
• Robot arms [6]
• Cranes
• Drill [6]
• Sampler [6]
• Wheels
Example Attacks
1. Disable
Interactions
← Data Analysis: Receiving commands
← Power Generation: Providing power
→ Space Environment: Impacting the state of the envir-
onment
→ Thermal: Cooling or heating
Mobility—The mobility component provides the capability of
physical movement on the planet. This allows a robot to move
to and explore different locations of the surface of a planet.
Such future application may include goods transportation and
mining.
Example Instantiations
• Wheels
• Legs
Example Attacks
1. Disable
Interactions
← Data Analysis: Receiving commands
← Power Generation: Providing power
→ Space Environment: Impact the orientation or position
of the vehicle
Ground Segment Sub-architecture
The sub-architecture shown in Figure 3 describes the terrestrial
ground segment of a space system, including communication
stations, control centres, tracking centres and user terminals
(e.g., satellite TV dishes in homes). Aspects such as launch
and construction facilities are out of the scope of this reference
architecture. As the FAIR-SPACE hub is focusing on orbital,
planetary and human-robot interactions, these are the areas in
which a security analysis is focused on. A ground segment is
a crucial part of that security analysis, hence why it has been
included, however other reference architectures or techniques
should be used to explore the full range of cyber-physical
attacks against the ground segment of space systems.
This sub-architecture reuses the following components from
other sub-architectures:
• Satellite/Data Storage
Communications—The ground segment will be capable of
communicating with vehicles in space. The terrestrial devices
that perform communication will vary in capability, from
highly capable devices used by nation states to commercial
TV or internet antennas. Changing technology means that
more entities have access to devices such as SDRs making it
easier to decode satellite communication and also transmit to
satellites.
Example Instantiations
• Short Range Omni-directional
• Short Range Directional
• Long Range Directional
Example Attacks
1. Denial of Service (via Jamming)
2. Spoofing
3. Elevation of Privilege (via crafted messages)
4. Replay attacks
5. Sybil attacks
Interactions
↔ Satellite/Communications: Send commands and re-
ceive telemetry
↔ Terrestrial Communications:
↔ Data Storage:
Terrestrial Communications—The ground segment will also
have communications that interact with local devices (such as
via WiFi) and devices across the Internet. Internet connectivity
allows multiple physically separate aspects of the ground
segment to communicate with each other.
Example Instantiations
• Physical Cable to the Internet
• Wireless LAN
Example Attacks
1. Intrusion into local network [77]
Interactions
↔ Internet: Access to internet
↔ Communications:
↔ Data Storage:
Sensing—The ground segment will perform sensing of the
space environment. Some sensing that is performed on Earth
will not be trivial to replicate in orbit, so satellites will depend
on this information for safe and secure operation. One example
application is debris tracking, which provides information on
how satellites should alter their orbit to avoid collisions.
Example Instantiations
• Debris Tracking (via optical camera)
• Satellite Tracking
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Example Attacks
1. Denial of Service
2. Spoofing
Interactions
← Environment: Observing the state of the space envir-
onment
→ Data Storage: Providing the sensed data
Actuators—This module contains any components that can
perform an action with an impact on the physical world.
One example is a component that changes the angle of the
orbital communication antenna in order to adjust the orbital
communication window.
Example Instantiations
• Antenna Control
Example Attacks
1. Disable
2. Manipulate
Interactions
← Data Analysis: Receiving commands
→ Environment: Changing environment state
Data Analysis—The data analysis component act as a con-
trolling centre to dealing the information from HMI, sensors
and data storage. It acts as a central hub for analysing inform-
ation and then identification action to perform. As this is a
ground station, there will be humans-in-the-loop evaluating
and acting on the system analysis and recommendations.
Example Instantiations
• Orbit determination
• Manoeuvre Planning (including debris avoidance)
• Path planning (for non-autonomous planetary robots)
• Calibration Activities3
Example Attacks
1. Elevation of Privilege
Interactions
← Data Storage: Providing sensed data for analysis
← HMI: User input
→ Actuators: Controlling actuators
Human Machine Interface (HMI)—The HMI component is
a user interface or dashboard that allows a person to provide
input to the system and receive information output. While the
term can technically be applied to any screen that allows a user
to interact with a device, there will be several other ways in
which a person can interact with the ground segment system.
Example Instantiations
• User Interface
3https://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Observing_the_
Earth/Copernicus/Ground_Segment_overview
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Example Attacks
1. Information Disclosure
2. Elevation of Privilege
Interactions
→ Data Analysis: Input commands
← Environment: Receive commands from personnel
Power Supply—The ground segment will be supplied power,
typically via a national grid. However, additional power
sources such as generators, renewables or batteries in UPSs
may be present to supplement mains power for redundancy.
Example Instantiations
• Mains Power
• Generator (e.g., Diesel)
• Renewable Sources (solar, wind, etc.)
• Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)
Example Attacks
1. Denial of Service
Interactions
→ *: Providing power to other components
Summary
This section has abstractly described the three sub-
architectures of satellites, planetary robots and the ground
segment. In order to use this RA to analyse the attack surface
of that system it first needs to be defined. The next section
will describe the methodology to do the analysis before an
example use case is presented.
5. ATTACK SURFACE ANALYSIS
METHODOLOGY
The attack surface of a system comprises of the set of
interactions between an internal system component and an
external agent. This can be extended to consider the possible
attack paths through the system via compromised or vulnerable
components. This attack paths provides the sequence of
components that needs to be compromised for an adversary
to reach its goal. Identifying the components necessary to
perform the attack directs system designers to where they
need to develop mitigations. In this section, the methodology
to use the reference architecture to identify the sequence
of components that are necessary to perform the attack
is described. This methodology does not perform threat
identification. It is necessary to use the output from a threat
modelling to supply the list of threats, threat actors and their
goals, capabilities and resources. This information is needed
to understand if an adversary is capable of performing an
attack again a component or interaction between components.
Performing this analysis is broken down into two stages.
The first stage builds the concrete system and identifies the
environment for the use case. The second stage performs
the attack surface analysis which outputs attack trees in the
process. These attack trees specify the attack path required
for a threat actor to achieve a goal. This is different from a
goal-centric approach, where the analysis would start from
the compromised components needed to achieve the goal and
work backwards. Instead, the analysis starts from outside the
system and works inwards towards the goal.
Stage 1:
1. Identify the use case that will be analysed.
2. Identify the environment in which the use case will operate.
3. Instantiate the abstract components with the relevant com-
ponents to provide the functionality required by the use case.
4. Specify the interactions between concrete components.
What data/commands/interactions do they represent?
From a threat modelling, identify the specific threat actors
who are interested in attacking this system. For each threat
actor, specify its goals, capabilities, motivations, environment
and resources.
Stage 2:
1. Identify all interactions that cross the boundary of the
system.
2. For each of these components specify how they could be
compromised or attacked.
3. Check to see if this attack path achieves one of the goals
specified in stage 1.
4. Repeat from step 1, but instead identify interactions that
can attacker can take from the compromised or attacked
component.
Once stages 1 and 2 are complete attack trees can be created
to represent the path of compromise an attacker would need to
take through the system to achieve its goals. These attack trees
help identify where efforts need to be focused on to develop
mitigation to the identified attack.
Threat Modelling
As performing attack surface analysis using a reference archi-
tecture requires input from threat modelling, it is necessary
for a light threat modelling to be performed for our use case
analysis. Therefore, this section will give a brief and high-
level description of threat modelling before it is performed for
the use case analysis in the next section.
Threat modelling is the structured process of identifying a
system’s vulnerabilities, threat actors, cyber risks and impacts
as well as recommending appropriate countermeasures. An
effective threat modelling approach clarifies threat actor
capabilities, intentions, and the conditions which should
present for the attacks to be realised and create the impacts. It
also provides a vision of how the countermeasures may help
to mitigate the impact of the attacks. To analyse the attack
surface of specific instantiations (i.e., assets or functionality)
of the reference architecture, it is necessary to understand
primarily who the threat actors are and what their goals are. It
is also important to understand other aspects of the threat actor
such as their motivations, capabilities, resources and more.
The RA is used as a tool in our threat modelling approach to
identify the system’s potential entry points and its functionality
with respect to functional components, communication and
interactions. Thereafter, the assessment of potential threats
has been done by considering the examples in the literature
and the evolution of the system ecosystem for the system use
cases. The potential threats have been classed by using the
classification of STRIDE [78] and mapped with the threat
actors classification which is presented in Table 2. Finally,
the high-level attack trees have been plotted for each threat
scenario.
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Figure 4. Instantiation of Functional Viewpoint of Satellite Reference Architecture for Autonomous Debris Collection
6. USE CASE ANALYSIS
To demonstrate how to perform the attack surface analysis
we describe an example system that performs autonomous
debris collection. Such a system is used to reduce the potential
for collisions with this debris [79]. There have been several
different techniques considered to collect and remove debris,
from capturing with arms or nets [80] to electro-dynamic
tethers [81] and others. For this use case we focus on an
autonomous satellite that physically captures and de-orbits
debris where there is no human-in-the-loop controlling the
satellite. This system could rely upon ground-based debris
detection, but autonomous systems might also consider in-
orbit sensors [82].
We have used the reference architecture presented in Figures 4
and 5 to model the functional components of autonomous
debris collection. Using this instantiated reference architecture
and output from a threat modelling, attacks that aim to prevent
autonomous debris collection satellite finding/rendezvousing
with debris will be analysed.
The European Space Agency (ESA) estimates there are nearly
129 million different pieces of debris in space [83]. Such
objects move at high velocity in the Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
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and even very small objects with a size of millimetres can
cause damage. Approximately 22000 objects have been
catalogued with physical information (mass, size, shape) and
are being regularly tracked in ESA’s Database and Information
System Characterising Objects in Space (DISCOS) [84]. The
information in the database is necessary for the task of
autonomous debris collection due to the satellites needing
to perform target debris identification, route planning, attitude
determination, and debris retrieving planning. A potential
data poisoning attack on this database before it is sent
to the autonomous satellite can hinder such assignments.
Furthermore, due to the large quantity of existing space
debris, the cooperative space debris collection can be operated
collaboratively between satellites. These satellites may be
owned by multiple different organisations/companies, but need
to cooperate for their mutual benefit. A group of satellites may
decide among themselves which of them will collect particular
objects and de-orbit them according to the satellite’s resources
(power, remaining fuel) and distance to the debris. However, it
is possible a satellite may misinform others in the group about
its operation to gain financial benefit or introduce non-existent
debris to cause fuel wastage to rival satellites.
Discussion
Our threat modelling is comprised of two steps: the first step is
identifying all system functions with relevant components, and
the second step is identifying corresponding threats to these
functions with respect to a use case. We focus on autonomous
space debris collection as an example in this study due to the
growing debris collusion risks in orbits around the planet [85].
The attack surface of autonomous debris collection use-case
can be divided into three as (i) space debris database in the
ground segment, (ii) satellite-to-ground segment communica-
tion, and (iii) satellite. Different attacks can be conducted in
these attack surfaces. The classifications of attacks has been
borrowed from STRIDE [78]. The brief description of the
threat classes are:
• Spoofing: It refers to falsifying the identity of person or
data of an object. Threat actors can spoof a configuration, file,
machine, sensory data, or the role of a person.
• Tampering: It refers to intentionally changing the content
of data to cause an incorrect operation in the system. Threat
actors can tamper files, sensory data, or network.
• Reputation: It refers to the actions of threat actors that
cannot be traced. It is associated with the logging system.
• Information disclosure: It refers gaining unauthorised
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access to the data storage or data flow.
• Denial of service: It refers to interrupting the regular
operation of the system. It is a common type of cyber-attack,
which can be implemented by preventing system resources
with fake requests.
• Elevation of privilege: It refers to performing an unauthor-
ised action by a threat actor.
Space debris has been catalogued in databases with identi-
fication information such as a unique object identifier, and a
set of attributes such as epoch, shape, size, mass, type, and
environment solar and geomagnetic activity data [86]. This
information is not only necessary for the satellites performing
debris collection but also for planning space missions since
small object may cause significant damage. In the autonomous
debris collection use case being considered, there are a number
of threats such as system may be vulnerable to. In order to
identify these threats it is first important to understand who
the threat actors are (an exploration is shown in Table 2) and
what their goals, motivations, resources and capabilities are.
The primary attack surface considered for this use-case is the
satellite-to-ground segment wireless communication channel
as shown in Figure 6 by an attack tree. The satellites receives
information about debris positions from the database in the
ground segment, which is then stored in their on-board data
storage unit, and the debris database is updated accordingly.
Based on this communication, a number of attacks could be
made:
• The communication channel can be jammed (DoS) to
prevent commands or database updates from being delivered
to the satellite, or telemetry received from it.
• Software updates could be maliciously falsified (tampering)
cause fuel wastage or financial impact to rivals.
• The communication channel could be remotely spoofed by
a threat actor.
• Jamming attacks are possible with limited capabilities and
resources, especially when considering the changes in the
space ecosystem in terms of increasing connectivity and
reducing costs (see Table 1).
• Tampering attacks usually require higher capabilities and
resources.
Autonomous debris collection can be also prevented by
conducting attacks on the collection satellite in situ. Un-
like the other attack surfaces, elevation of privilege can be
exploited through entry points such as IO ports and wireless
communications. The satellite’s on-board sensors can also be
blinded (DoS). The likelihood of occurrence of these attacks is
fairly low for when considering the majority of existing threat
actors (except for nation-state level threat actors). However, as
16
NewSpace will reduce barriers to deployment, the likelihood
of these threats will rise in the near future. Therefore, it is
important to consider these threats due to the need for high
fault tolerance of space missions [87].
7. DISCUSSION
Further Components for Reference Architecture
In this work we have focused on three core components in
a space system, that is, (i) satellites in orbit, (ii) planetary
robots and (iii) the terrestrial ground segment. However,
these core components have intentionally avoided considering
human aspects of spaceflight in order to focus on robotic and
computer systems. In future work, this reference architecture
will be extended to consider systems such as orbital and
planetary stations that support life and also consider other
human elements such as spacesuits.
Further Scenarios to Consider
The reference architecture developed in this work has focused
on analysing systems that are currently deployed. This work
has not considered the period of time where devices are being
launched, transferring to the location they will operate, or
during descent. These will be vital scenarios to consider
cyber security aspects within, due to their mission due to their
mission critical nature. However, analysing these scenarios
will require specifying additional contextual information.
Therefore, we will focus on analysing these scenarios in future
work.
This RA has focused on the functionality of system com-
ponents and interactions between functionality that comprise
individual entities in a space system. It has intentionally not
considered threats based on system implementations. This
means that vulnerabilities in software, supply chain tampering
and other implementation issues cannot be analysed using this
approach. This is intentional, as this RA is intended to be used
for a high-level analysis and other approaches will be more
suitable for low-level analyses.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have identified that the space industry is
currently changing or is likely to change in the future in
terms of the connectivity of space systems, the autonomy of
those systems and the culture around commercialisation and
innovation. These are affecting many dimensions of the space
ecosystem, from the cost of deployment to the introduction
of novel capabilities, which are having a further impact on
the threat landscape for space systems. In order to represent
and analyse the path of compromise, an adversary will need
to take to achieve their objectives, we propose using a hybrid
functional-interaction viewpoint of a reference architecture.
This reference architecture has then been demonstrated using
an example of future use case of autonomous debris collection.
The output of this analysis can then be used to identify key
functional aspects of a system where mitigations will need to
be employed.
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